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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

## BY NATURE AND BY ART

### I

CURRENT philosophical theories of knowledge are strangely neglectful of the implications and consequences of the revolution that has taken place in the actual subject-matter and methods of scientific knowledge. In substance, this revolution may be said to be one from knowledge that is such "by nature" to scientific subject-matter which is what it is because it is "by art." The classic scheme, following Aristotle, held that the subject-matter of science, as the highest grade of knowledge, is what it is because of certain inherent forms, essences, or natures. These indwelling and constitutive natures are eternal, immutable, and necessary. It followed that in the Greek-medieval system all *sciences*, from astronomy to biology, were concerned with species or kinds, which are immutably the same and eternally separated from one another by the fixed natures forming their inherent essences or Being.

Other forms of knowledge, such as were called sense-perception and opinion, were also what they were by the nature of their inherent Beings; or, more strictly, by the unchangeable and incorrigible partiality or defect of Being which marked them. For over against fixed and eternal species constituted by inherent essential forms were the things that change; things that are generated and perish. Alteration, modifiability, mutability, are *ipso facto* proof of instability and inconstancy. These in turn are proof of lack of Being in its full sense. It is because of lack, or privation, of self-contained and self-sufficient Being that some things are variable and transient, now one thing and now another. The lack of inherent natures or essences is equivalent to dependence upon circumstances that are external, this dependence upon what is outside being manifested in their variability. In classic terminology, science is concerned with "formal causes," that is, with inherent natures which "cause" things to be *what* they are. Sense-knowledge and opinion are inferior forms of knowledge concerned with things which by their natures are so mutable that knowledge of them is itself unstable and shifting—as in the case of things touched, heard, seen.

It should not be necessary to dwell upon the fact that according to what is now science what the ancient scheme relegated to an inferior position, namely, efficient and material "causes," constitutes the only legitimate subject-matter of natural science, acceptance of the view that essential forms or natures are its subject-matter accounting for the sterility of science during the period before the scientific revolution occurred. According to the ancient doctrine, the subject-matter of sense-knowledge and opinion on one side, and of science on the other, are forever separated by a gulf that is impassable for the reason that it is cosmological and ontological—that is, due to the very "being" of the subjects involved. In what now constitutes science, the difference is methodological. For it is due to *methods of inquiry,* not to inherent natures. Potentially the subject-matters of sense and opinion are science in the making; they are its raw material. Increased maturity of the procedures and techniques of inquiry will transform their material into scientific knowledge. On the other side, there is no subject-matter of the scientific kind which is eternally the same and not subject to improvement with further development in efficacy of inquiry-procedures.

The scientific revolution, which put science upon the road of steady advance and ever increasing fertility, is connected with substitution of knowledge "by art" for that said to be "by nature." The connection is not remote nor recondite. The arts are concerned with production, with generation, with doing and making. They fall, therefore, within the domain of things which in the classic scheme are mutable, and of which, according to that scheme, scientific knowledge is impossible. According to the present conduct of science and according to its conclusions, science consists of knowledge of *orders of change.* While this fact marks a complete departure from the classic view, it does not suffice of itself to justify calling scientific knowledge an art, though it provides a condition without which that designation is not warranted, for it completely breaks down the grounds upon which a fixed and impassable line was originally drawn between the subject-matters of science and of art. For it connects science with change. The consideration that completes the ground for assimilating science to art is the fact that assignment of scientific status in any given case rests upon facts which are experimentally produced. Science is now the product of operations deliberately undertaken in conformity with a plan or project that has the properties of a working hypothesis. The value or validity of the latter is tested, as in the case of any art, by what happens in consequence of the operations it instigates and directs. Moreover,

science is assimilated to the conditions defining an art by the fact that, as in the case of any industrial art, production of relevant and effective consequences depends upon use of artificially designed appliances and apparatus as means of execution of the plan that directs the operations which are undertaken.

## II

It is an old and familiar story that "nature" is a word of many senses. One of its senses has been mentioned. According to it, the nature of that which is undergoing investigation, say combustion, electricity, or whatever, is the subject-matter of scientific generalizations. We still use the expression "the nature" of something or other in this sense, though, I imagine, with decreasing frequency. But when we do use it in this sense, its meaning is radically different from that possessed by the same expression in the classic scheme. For it no longer designates a fixed and inherent essence, or Being, that makes facts to *be* what they are. Instead, it signifies an order of connected changes, an order which is found to be fruitfully effective in understanding and dealing with particular changes. The difference is radical.[1]

Another meaning of "nature" is *cosmological.* The word is used to stand for the world, for the universe, for the sum total of facts which actually and potentially are the subject of inquiry and knowledge. With respect to this sense of "nature," ancient philosophy has an important advantage over the general tenor of modern philosophy. For while modern philosophy is conformable to actual scientific practice in eliminating an ontological difference, or a difference in kinds of Being, between the eternal and the changing, it has, unfortunately, tended to substitute for this difference one equally fixed between supposed subjective and objective orders of Being.[2] "Unfortunately" is in fact too mild and neutral a word. For the net effect has been to set up a seat and agency of knowing over against Nature as that known. Hence the "knower" becomes in effect extra-natural. Historically, the facts of the case are easily explainable. For while in the Greek version mind in both its sensible and its rational operations was a culminating manifestation or terminal "end," of natural facts, in the medieval version (out of which modern theory grew without out-

[1] It may be remarked in passing that the *old* sense of the "nature" of a thing still prevails in discussion of moral and social subjects; and this fact may explain the continued stagnation and infertility of inquiry in these fields.

[2] Virtual synonyms are "mental" and "physical" orders, and "personal" and "impersonal," taken as separate and opposed with reference to their inherent stuffs or subject-matters.

growing some of its major tenets) soul and mind took on definitely supernatural traits. These traits, in a more or less attenuated form, reappear in the extra-natural knowing "subject" of modern philosophy as that is set over against the natural world as "object."

To complete the statement of the terms of the question under discussion, it is necessary to note explicitly the sense of "nature" and "natural" in which they contrast with "art" and "artificial." For in the cosmological sense of nature, the saying of Shakespeare holds to the effect that nature is made better by no mean but nature makes that mean; in the third sense of natural (that just mentioned), science is definitely and conclusively a matter of art, not of nature.

We most readily lay hold of the meaning of this statement by presenting to ourselves a picture of an astronomical observatory or a physical laboratory. And we have to include as part of the picture the rôle of collections of books and periodicals, which operate in the most intimate and vital working connection with the other means by which science is carried on. For the body of printed matter is what enables the otherwise highly restricted material of immediate perception to be linked with subject-matters having an indefinitely wide spatial and temporal range. For only in fusion with book-material does what is immediately present take on scientific status, and only in fusion with the latter does the former cease to be "theoretical" in the hypothetical sense of that word. For only as culturally transmitted material with its deep and wide scope is anchored, refreshed, and tested through continually *here-and-now* materials provided by direct experimental observations does it become a warranted part of authentic science.

A further qualification has to be added to complete the statement that science with respect to both method and conclusions is an art. For there is a sense in which every form of knowledge is an affair of art. For all knowledge, even the most rudimentary such as is attributable to low-grade organisms, is an expression of skill in selection and arrangement of materials so as to contribute to maintenance of the processes and operations constituting life. It is not a metaphorical expression to say that at the very least all animals know *how*, in virtue of organic structure and physiological processes in connection with trans-cuticular conditions, to do things of this sort. When, then, it is said that science, as distinct from other modes of knowledge, is an art, the word "art" is used with a differential property. The operations of *search* that constitute the art or skill marking other modes of knowledge develop into re-search.

A more concrete qualification of the art which constitutes scientific knowledge is its dependence upon *extra-organic* appliances and instrumentalities, themselves artificially devised. The scientific revolution may be said to have been initiated when investigators borrowed apparatus and processes from the industrial arts and used them as means of obtaining dependable scientific data. The use of the lens was of itself almost enough to revolutionize the science of astronomy. As we look back, we note that the bulk of early knowledge was in fact built up through the pursuit of industrial and mechanical arts. The low social status of artisans (in which class were included sculptors, architects, painters of pictures, musicians, in fact all producers save those working with words) was "rationalized" in the doctrine of the inherently inferior state of all knowledge of this kind. At best, it was "empirical" in the disparaging sense of that word. Fundamentally, the scientific revolution consisted of transformation of "empirical" into *experimental.* The transformation was effected, historically, by adoption, as means of obtaining scientific knowledge, of devices and processes previously employed in industry to obtain "material" ends—in that sense of "material" which identifies "matter" with the menial and servile. After a period in which natural knowledge progressed by *borrowing* from the industrial crafts, science entered upon a period of steady and ever-accelerated growth by means of deliberate invention of such appliances on its own account. In order to mark this differential feature of the art which is science, I shall now use the word "technology."[3]

Because of technologies, a circular relationship between the arts of production and science has been established. I have already spoken of the dependence of science as now conducted upon the use of appliances and processes such as were once confined to the "utilitarian" and "practical" ends to which a subordinate and "base" status was attributed socially and morally. On the other hand, before the application in a return movement of science in the industrial arts, production was a routine affair. It was marked by imitation and by following established models and precedents. Innovation and invention were accidental rather than systematic. Application of scientific conclusions and methods

[3] While a number of writers have brought forward the facts which are involved in this view, Dr. Clarence Ayres, as far as I am aware, was the first one explicitly to call science a mode of technology. It is probable that I might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used "technology" instead of "instrumentalism" in connection with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.

liberated production from this state—a state justifying use of the adjective "empirical" in its disparaging sense. Through incorporation into the arts of production of the methods and conclusions of science, they are capable of becoming "rational" in the honorific sense of that word. The phrase "rationalization of production" states a fact. Indeed, it may be said that the distinction between science and other technologies is not intrinsic. It is dependent upon cultural conditions that are extrinsic to both science and industry. Were it not for the influence exerted by these conditions, the difference between them would be conventional to the point of being verbal. But as long as some technologies are carried on for personal profit at the expense of promotion of the common welfare, the stigma of "materialism" will continue to be attached to industrial technologies, and the honorific adjective "idealistic" will be monopolized by the technology which yields knowledge—especially if that knowledge is "pure"—that is, in the classic view, uncontaminated by being put to "practical" use.

## III

Valuable instruction concerning a number of mooted problems in the theory of knowledge may be derived from the underlying principles of the prior discussion. One of them, perhaps the most obvious on the surface, is the fact that many classifications and distinctions which have been supposed to be inherent or intrinsic to knowing and knowledge are in fact due to socio-cultural conditions of a historical, and therefore temporal and local, sort. There is the fact (upon which I have dwelt at length in previous writings) of the arbitrary and irrelevant nature of the sharp line drawn in the classic philosophical tradition between "theoretical" and "practical" knowledge. The gulf that was supposed to separate them is in fact merely a logical corollary of the view that the proper subject of scientific knowledge is eternal and immutable. The connection of science with change and the connection of the methods of science with experimental production of change have completely vitiated this doctrine. The infertility of natural knowledge before adoption of the experimental method is attributable, in large measure, to the fact that ancient and medieval science took the material of ordinary observation "as is"; that is, in lumps and chunks as given "naturally" in a ready-made state. In consequence, the only treatment to which it could be subjected was dialectical.

What is not so obvious upon the surface is that a theory of knowledge based upon the conduct and conclusions of science does

away, once and for all, with the fixed difference supposed to exist between sense-knowledge and rational-knowledge. The sensory aspect of knowledge is strictly an *aspect*. It is distinguishable in intellectual analyses that are undertaken for special purposes. But it is not, as it was long taken to be, a special kind of knowledge nor yet a separate component in knowledge. It is that aspect of the system of knowledge, in and by which knowledge extending across an indefinitely extensive spatial and temporal range of facts is anchored and focalized in that which is *here-and-now*. Without demonstrated anchorage of this sort, any system, no matter how well organized with respect to internal consistency, is "theoretical" in the sense of being hypothetical. On the other hand, the "rational" aspect of knowledge is constituted by the corpus of extant knowledge which has been constituted by prior inquiries and which is so organized as to be communicable—and hence applicable to results of further inquiry by which the old system is corrected and extended.

The principle underlying these special matters is that the legitimate subject-matter of a *theory* of knowledge consists of *facts* that are known at a given time, with, of course, the proviso that the procedures by which this body of knowledge has been built up are an integral part of it. This view of the grounds of a competent theory of knowledge stands in open opposition to that which underlies the *epistemological* theory: the postulate, namely, that no subject-matter is entitled to be called knowledge until it has been shown to satisfy conditions that are laid down prior to any case of actual knowledge and independently of any conclusion reached in the course of the inquiries by which knowledge in the concrete is arrived at. The completeness of the opposition between the two postulates may be judged from the following consideration. Upon the ground of the first postulate subject-matter is entitled to the name of knowledge when it is determined by the methods of inquiry, test, verification, and systematic arrangement, or organization, which are factually employed in the sciences. Upon the other basis, the antecedent conditions apply to any and every case, good, bad, and indifferent. Hence they are of an entirely different order from the facts of actual investigation, test, and verification, which warrant use of the name "knowledge" in its honorific sense in actual instances.

It was then inevitable, from the standpoint of logic, that the epistemological approach culminated in the Kantian question: How is knowledge possible anyway (*ueberhaupt*)? If the question were put with reference to the "possibility" of any other subject under investigation, the *existence* of the subject-matter under in-

quiry would be the starting point. It suffices, for example, to show that cancer exists for the question as to its possibility to be simply the question of the specific conditions of an *actuality*. Only in the case of knowledge is it supposed that the question of its "possibility" is one which puts actuality into total doubt until certain universal antecedent conditions have been laid down and shown to be satisfied.

In the case of cancer, for example, the question of possibility means that our knowledge is still in a doubtful and indeterminate state, so that research is going on to discover the characteristic properties, conditions, and consequences of facts whose actual existence sets the problem. Yet strangely enough (strangely, provided, that is, historical-cultural facts are left out of account) the dogmatic and contradictory assumption that there exists knowledge of the conditions of knowledge prior to and conditioning every specific instance of knowledge arrogated to itself the name of a *critical* theory of knowledge!

## IV

I do not propose to discuss further this contradiction, beyond saying that the contradiction will be obvious to anyone who views the matter in terms of the facts of knowledge, instead of in terms supplied by the history of philosophical systems viewed in isolation from other cultural events. I propose rather to set forth some of the historical-cultural conditions which generated in general the epistemological assumption of prior conditions to be satisfied; and which, in particular, led to the "subject-object" formula about these conditions. One of the influential factors consists of the conditions existing when the scientific revolution took place. It is hardly possible to over-emphasize the fact that these conditions were those of revolt not merely against long accepted intellectual doctrines but also against customs and institutions which were the carriers of these doctrines, and which gave them a support extraneous to their own constituents. Because of causes which are psychologically adequate, if not factually so, the word "social" has come to be regarded as applicable to that which is institutionally established and which exerts authority because of this fact. The adjective "individual" is identified on this basis with that which marks a departure from the traditionally and institutionally established, especially if the departure is of a quality involving revolt and a challenge to the rightful authority of tradition and custom.

These conditions were fully and strikingly present at the time of the rise of modern science. Every book on the history of philosophy mentions the fact that the philosophical literature of the

fifteenth and subsequent centuries is marked by treatises, essays, tractates, that deal with the methods to be adopted and pursued if scientific knowledge is to be actually obtained. The negative aspect of these new ventures is assault, overt or implicit, upon all that had long been accepted as science. There was in effect, if not openly, an assertion that currently accepted subject-matter was hardly more than a systematized collection of errors and falsities. The necessity of radically new procedures of assault upon existing "science" was uniformly treated as an affair of *method.* It was because of the *methods* habitually used and sanctioned that existing "science" was stagnant, and so far removed from its proper mark—understanding of nature. Other documents upon right methods may not have used the words of Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum,* much less endorsed its precepts. But they were at one with him in proclaiming the necessity of a complete break with traditional methods and in stark opposition to the tenets of the *Organon* of Aristotle.

If the movement of protest, revolt, and innovation that was expressed in these documents and put in practice in the new astronomy and "natural philosophy" had been confined to "science" in its technical and isolated aspect, there would not have been the crisis that actually occurred. The facts constituting what is called "the conflict of science with religion"—or theology—clearly and convincingly prove that the movement of innovation, protest, and revolt was not so confined. The new science was treated as morally heretical and as a dangerous menace to the very foundations of a stable and just social order. Upon the Continent, especially, it was treated as rebellion against divinely established authority. In a more fundamental way than in the ecclesiastic movement named Protestantism, it was a protest against established foundations in morals and religion. Its opponents made this point clear when its proponents failed to do so.

Stated in slightly different terms, the subject-object formulation of the conditions to be satisfied before any subject-matter has a right to the honorable title of "knowledge" has to be viewed in vitally intimate connection with those movements in political and economic institutions which popularly bear the name "individualism." For, as has been already remarked, any departure from traditions and customs that are incorporated in and backed by institutions having firmly established authority is regarded as "individual" in a non-social and *anti*-social sense by the guardians of old forms in church and state. Only at a later time, when it is possible to place events in a long historic perspective instead of in the short-time crowded and broken perspective of what is im-

mediately contemporary, can so-called "individualism" be seen to be as "social" in origin, content, and consequences as are the customs and institutions which are in process of modification.

In this cultural situation, the fact that philosophers as unlike as Descartes and Berkeley both refer to the seat and agent of knowledge as "I" or an "ego," a personal self, has more than casual significance. This reference is especially significant as evidence of the new climate of opinion just because no attempt at justification accompanied it. It was taken to be such an evident matter that no argument in its behalf was called for. References and allusions of this kind are the forerunners of the allegedly "critical" attempt of Kant to frame an account of the conditions of knowledge in terms of a "transcendental ego," after Hume had demonstrated the shaky character of the "empirical" self as the source and agent of authentic knowledge.

If we adopt the customary course of isolating philosophies in their historical appearance which is their actuality from other socio-cultural facts, if we treat the history of philosophy as something capable of being understood in the exclusive terms of documents labeled philosophical, we shall look at the outstanding feature of modern philosophy as one of a conflict between doctrines appealing to "sense-experience" as ultimate authority and theories appealing to intuition and reason, a conflict reaching a supposed solution in the Kantian reconciliation of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. When these philosophies are placed in their cultural context, they are seen to be partners in a common movement, both schools being in revolt against traditional science in its methods, premises, and conclusions, while both schools are engaged in search for a new and different seat of intellectual and moral authority. There are indeed significant differences between the two schools. But when these are historically viewed, they appear as differences of emphasis, one school inclining to the "conservative" phase of cultural institutions, and the other school to the "progressive" or radical phase.

While those aspects of the new science which express initiative, invention, enterprise, and independence of custom (on the ground that customs are more likely to be distorting and misleading than helpful in attaining scientific knowledge) are necessary conditions for generation of the subject-object formulation, they are far from being its sufficient condition. Unquestioned persistence of fundamental tradition controlled protest against other customs. Medieval institutions centered in belief in an immaterial soul or spirit. This belief was no separate item. It permeated every aspect of life. The drama of the fall, the redemption, and the

eternal destiny for weal or woe, of the soul was all-controlling in the accepted view of the creation and history of the universe and of man. Belief in the soul was so far from being just an intellectual tenet that poignant emotion and the deepest and most vivid images of which man is capable centered about it. The church that administered the concerns of the soul was in effect the dominant educational and political institution of the period.

Secularizing movements gradually undermined the monopoly of authority possessed by the church. Although interests of a natural type did not supersede supernatural interests, they tended to push them out of a central into a peripheral position. But supernatural concerns retained such force in moral and religious matters that the theory of knowledge was routed through the channels they had worn after the *facts* of science were wearing a natural channel. This roundabout channel seemed, because of the force of habit, more "natural" than any indicated by the facts of science. The enormous gap between knowledge-facts and epistemological theory which marks modern philosophy was instituted.

In spite of revolt and innovation, the hold of the belief in the soul as knowing subject upon the attitudes which controlled the formation of the theory of knowledge was so firm that it could not be broken until the institutions, upon which the belief in its concrete validity depended had undergone definite degeneration.

Revolt and innovation were sufficient, however, to bring to explicit and emphatic statement one aspect of the Christian doctrine of the soul, an aspect which was kept covert and hidden in the dominant institutionalism of the Middle Ages. This aspect was the *individual* or singular nature of the subject of sin, redemption, punishment, and reward. Protestantism insisted upon making this aspect of the Christian position overt and central in religious matters. The writers who were concerned with the new science performed a similar task in the theories of knowledge they promulgated. The hold of the old doctrine, even upon those most indifferent to its theological phases, is shown in the persistence of belief in an immaterial mind, consciousness, or whatever, as being the seat and agent of knowledge. The influence of the belief upon the new science, even with its fundamental revolt and innovation, is exhibited in identification of the subject and agent of sound knowledge with "individuals" who had freed themselves from the perverting and deadening effect of custom and tradition. Even today those who deny in words that mind and consciousness are organs of knowledge, replacing them with an organic body or with the nervous system of the organism, attribute to the latter an isolation from the rest of nature (including transmitted and com-

municated culture) which is much more than reminiscent of the lonely isolation of the medieval soul.

It took more than the undeniable but negative fact of the gradual attenuation and decay of the importance once attached to the soul as seat of knowledge to effect an adequate elimination. The new movement of science had to achieve, on the ground of its own methods and conclusions, a positive conquest of those aspects of natural fact that deal with life and human history before complete elimination could occur. Only during the last hundred years (less than that in fact) have the sciences of biology, cultural anthropology, and history, especially of "origins," reached a stage of development which places man and his works squarely within nature. In so doing they have supplied the concrete and verified positive facts that make possible and imperatively demand formation of a systematic theory of knowledge in which the facts of knowledge are specified or described and organized exactly as are the facts of the sciences which are the relevant subject-matter of a theory of knowledge. Only in this way will the facts of our knowledge-systems and those of the theory of knowledge be brought into harmony with one another, and the present glaring discrepancy between them be done away with.

JOHN DEWEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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## CAN WE CHOOSE BETWEEN VALUES?

VALUE theory can become very esoteric, as it occasionally tends to become in the technical periodicals. But there are also certain elementary, not to say naïve, aspects of human valuation that should not be lost sight of. Above all—and this is not so naïve—an attempt must be made to choose among the values presented by a culture. However risky or impertinent, that effort is necessary. Any aseptic refusal to make moral choices is to do no more than accept uncritically choices that others have already made. Some assumptions underlying such an attempt will be presented here. And a preliminary one will be the way the term "value" itself is being understood: values, at least so far as they particularly concern ethics, are the results of man's long-time preferences —preferences in the central area encompassing his basic attitudes of life, his deep-rooted tastes and interests, his objects of respect and reverence.

*The Biological Basis of Value Decision.*—There can be little question that the starting place for decision about human values

must be found in the biological wants that drive man's energies. These would include the straight physiological demands for food, shelter, sexual expression, health, and growth; the psychical urge for meaning, self-expression, satisfaction of curiosity, and a widened and heightened sensitivity; the social needs that force the individual to stretch out for others: all of them—physiological, psychic, and social—developing into some kind of pattern, symmetrical or crippled, that will provide the background for a personality. Even this kind of catalogue, of course, is atrociously oversimplified. For example, "health" and "growth," not to mention some of the others, are themselves abstract concepts when, actually, what they are supposed to represent are specific conditions and processes that require detailed physiological itemizing. Health or growth, or even seemingly more specific needs such as that of sexual expression, are names given *ex post facto* to a series of concrete happenings; to regard them as already established in some *a priori* fashion is to interpret human "drives" as antecedent philosophical principles rather than as tissue changes. Such a qualification does not destroy the validity of listing the possibly abstract human wants that must be considered; it does sound a note of warning when they become hypostatized into biological entities.

Another oversimplification is in the otherwise excellent word, "pattern." For a pattern does not emerge automatically or painlessly out of man's basic wants; it is not like a blend counseled in a recipe, a little of this and a little of that. Human needs, and the interests that arise from them, are in conflict throughout. In this conflict, choices, however unconscious, are made and values come forth as they do on other levels; also, as on other levels, if the conflict becomes unendurable one or more of the interests must go. The personality pattern that begins to issue from this elemental competition is a compromise that has been hammered out of a struggle for existence as savage, even if as private, as any in biological history. All this is not meant to complicate the present argument. It is merely to notice that the phrase, "satisfaction of basic physical needs," is not the primer kind.

But it is primer-simple to insist that in any approach to the problem of human values the beginning is to be found among the biological and psychological wants. This is something of a banal observation. But as commonplace as it is, the point has too often been overlooked by the traditional philosophic approach to value. No ethical system, no hierarchy of values, can be established with any pretense to relevance or permanence without a foundation having been laid; the building-blocks of that foundation can be

nothing else but the elemental human wants. Unlike the story about the world resting on a tortoise and the tortoise on something else and so on "all the way down," such a foundation needs no other Atlas to support it. It is itself the massive base of all human history—the base, not necessarily the delicate tracery of the topmost stonework.

Which is to say nothing more than this: that unless man has sufficient and correct food and shelter he will either die or grow into an unhealthy, stunted caricature; that unless he has opportunities for psychical as well as physical satisfaction, i.e., a chance to develop curiosity, to widen his horizons, to exhaust his capacity for meaning, sensitivity, and intellectual growth, he will become a counterfeit man, the "boob" that cynical Menckens and contemptuous Nietzsches have always held up to scorn; that, finally, unless he participate fully in the society of which he is an integral part, being given the opportunity to contribute whatever his talents permit and to share proportionately in the economic, political, educational, and cultural life of that society, he must turn into a part-man, a false replica of the more complete personality that full social participation could help to create. These may be truisms. Certainly they need the specific elaboration that this paper is not attempting. Nevertheless, as a *sine qua non* for the erection of a system of values, this whole cluster of primal demands must first be grappled with. However precious, even esoteric, ethical and esthetic values may become, they can not cut themselves loose from the framework of biological and psychological and social needs in which human beings have to grow. Reiteration of this elementary point should be unnecessary; unfortunately, it is necessary—at least (occasionally) for philosophers.

*The Social Basis.*—But preliminary observations like these about the foundation of human values afford little help in making choices between different and conflicting sets of values. *Which* personality pattern is to be applauded and *which* wants? To declare that as many human wants as possible are to be satisfied is incontrovertible, but only in an honorific, not to say a constipated, sense; for there is an unholy struggle constantly going on, and that the pattern which emerges will automatically be entire and symmetrical is a little too much to expect. But even if it were smooth and well-rounded, again, what is the criterion of judgment? Is it symmetrical for the lady's man or for the philosopher? Is the standard that of sacrifice or pleasure, and if so, what kind? Is it happiness?—and what is that? Is the path of life to be one of detached contemplation or of sensual abandonment, of action or of classic restraint, of love or of duty—paths of life that Professor Charles

Morris has called by names such as Buddhist, Dionysian, Promethean, Apollonian, Christian, and so on?

The easiest way out perhaps would be to by-pass this most ancient and yet most modern and most tremendous of human decisions by saying, a little of one and some of the other. A harmonious synthesis might seem to be indicated. Something of Gandhi and of John Dewey, and even of Nietzsche, might be prescribed. Indeed, Professor Morris does a little of this in his presentation of Maitreyan Man. However, that kind of synthesis is eminently plausible only, again, in an honorific sense. What would be needed to effect such a laudable amalgam would be a super-culture, one in which the historical and technical differentials between cultures would be, by some over-algebra, canceled out. For there is a struggle—not necessarily overt—between cultures just as there is among man's basic drives. In addition, the diverse values that are championed in such a competition are themselves not accounted for by man's biological needs; those needs, it must be repeated, are the foundation for any system of values, but the way the architecture grows is a cultural, not a biological, matter. It is a technological matter. Therefore, it would seem that the momentous process of choosing among the "paths of life" would also be a cultural and technological one. Certain suggestions about that technique of decision will follow, although it must be realized (without any false modesty) that such a presentation can be no more than a tentative outline.[1]

Laying down a series of assumptions may be the easiest way to sketch that outline. One of those assumptions has already been used in the preceding paragraphs. It is to the effect that the choice among human values can not be made on the basis of an abstract and transcendental criterion which, however noble it may be, stands outside the system it is expected to judge. At least, the choice can not be made legitimately and functionally on such a basis. There would be required for that kind of choice either a super-culture—and, glorious as that would be, it has not yet appeared—or some intuition or revelation of the *right* hierarchy of values. The latter has been tried often enough but seldom with the honesty demanded by Jeremy Bentham's savage formula about "that sort of man who speaks out and says, I am of the number of the elect; now God himself takes care to inform the elect what is right. . . . If, therefore, a man wants to know what is right he has nothing to do but to come to me."

[1] In suggesting certain elements of this "technological" theory of value, the writer is deeply indebted to the work of Professor C. E. Ayres.

This assumption, however, is only a negative one. More positive would be the insistence that since we can't get out of a cultural process through tugging at our boot-straps and so arrive at some infinite and all-wise extrapolation, the standard for human value must be located intramurally within a going technology, within a set of functional social institutions. Of course, the words "going" and "functional" are question-begging ones, for what makes a system "go" or be "functional"? The following assumptions, all of them closely related, would attempt to give an answer:

(1) A culture must be judged by its efficiency in maintaining itself and by its progress along a definite technological line.

(2) That line of technological progress is determined by the degree in which men understand their surroundings—surroundings or environment being interpreted in the broadest sense as a culture matrix involving physical, biological, and social factors.

(3) Understanding or knowledge is a matter of doing—of control and change—not simply of contemplation.

Perhaps it may sound imprudent to assert that assumptions like these add up to a test for human values, that qualities like "right," "dynamic," "evolutionary," and so on are to be discovered in the direction in which society is moving. But what else can serve as a test?

*The Place of Knowledge in Determining Values.*—These assumptions, it will be noted, are pyramided, with the apex pointing to the moral significance of human knowledge and understanding. Now, in a philosophic setting, this is an overly familiar, if not a humdrum and pedestrian, point of view. From Plato and Aristotle on down, the good has been equated with truth, reason, thinking, above all with contemplation. The ultimate end of man is to be intelligent, which, for Aristotle and others, is to be happy. He has a "moral obligation to be intelligent." What, then, is different about an instrumentalist or technological approach to the equation of value with understanding? The answer would seem to lie in the emphasis upon the knowing *process*.

This process of knowing, of inquiry, of scientific method, of reflective thinking—all these are being used here as more or less interchangeable terms—is familiar enough to require no exposition. Fundamental to the procedure is the refusal to accept the traditional elevation of knowing over doing, of theory above practice. Methods are always of supreme interest to the experimentalist, and, by their very nature and use, methods must be operational and active. But this interpretation of knowing means much more than the employment of a tricky machinery. In its widest sense it sig-

nifies opposition to fixed ends, system-making, and changelessness; it signifies provisionalism and reconstruction, the reliance upon working hypotheses rather than upon immutable principles. Thus, this kind of knowing is in no wise limited to the professional scientist. It represents an attitude that can function in any area of experience (even valuation), an attitude of free and effective intelligence.

And it is such an attitude that must characterize the knowledge and understanding proposed here as the criterion of value. To put it quite bluntly, the test of human decision—on the social or individual level (if the two can with any meaning be separated)—is *the degree in which it manifests and preserves free intelligent inquiry*. The general ethical standard of human culture is that the scientific attitude (keeping in mind always the broadest possible meaning of that phrase) has become an integral part of it. In the procedures of instrumental knowing—the knowing that alone permits cultures to maintain themselves and to understand and control their surroundings—is to be found the validity of human values. These are all different ways of trying to say the same thing.

So, the free working of human intelligence becomes itself a supreme value. But does not this imply an *ultimate* value or end, one that sounds suspiciously like any other respectable *summum bonum* of historical ethics? John Dewey answers that question:

> I have carried on a polemic against ultimates and finalties because I found them presented as things that are inherently absolute, like "ends-in-themselves" instead of ends-in-relationships. The reason they have been proffered as absolutes is that they have been taken out of any and all *temporal* context. A thing may be ultimate in the sense of coming last in a given temporal series, so that it is ultimate *for that series*. There are things that come last in reflective valuations and, as terminal, they are ultimate. Now [one] is quite right in saying that for me the method of intelligent action is precisely such an ultimate value. It is the last, the final or closing, thing we come upon in inquiry into inquiry. But the place it occupies in the *temporal* manifestation of inquiry is what makes it such a value, not some property it possesses in and of itself, in the isolation of non-relatedness. It is ultimate in use and function; it does not claim to be ultimate because of an absolute "inherent nature" making it sacrosanct, a transcendent object of worship.[2]

Like knowledge, values are contextual. They are part of a process, of a technology. Outside their structure, they become meaningless or arbitrary. To be sure, techniques can be overplayed: "Americanism" in the bad sense, that in which gadgets become a compensation for refinement and the bourgeois virtues of successful manipulation are elevated above all, is a result. But that worship is

[2] Quoted from *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. I), p. 594.

precisely the thing that Dewey deplores. It comes from consecrating a methodology, from making it an end-in-itself; whereas an end-in-view, in a context or situation, functions as a plan of operation that helps to overcome a difficulty. There is nothing irretrievable about the "materialism" and crassness that is alleged to follow from the technological emphasis. In fact, the concentration on methods is itself a point of promise, since, although it can be and has been overdone, it constitutes a powerful prophylactic against the obstinate and pathological concern with human values that are unapproachably aloof.

It would appear, therefore, that to decide between values, between man's long-time cultural preferences, requires the premise that such choices are functions of a technology, that they are situational, not remote or disinfected. A further requirement seems to be that ethics, with its peculiar concern for values, must be fitted in with other aspects of a culture, particularly with those social and biological enterprises which trace the development of behavior patterns. Finally, a much more significant assumption is that value decision rests upon honest discrimination, that acceptance of just "any old" culture is a sign of flaccidity rather than of sophistication. The argument here has been to suggest that the technology which incorporates experimentalist knowing and control must set the norm for modern man.

GEORGE R. GEIGER

ANTIOCH COLLEGE

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## COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

### EXISTENCE AND COMMON SENSE

**Thus there is here supplied, I think, a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy which is offered us: Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in "reality" even the significance they had previously seemed to have?** [1]

#### I

Common sense, as a term of either praise or blame, has had various meanings in philosophy. One meaning is applied by Dewey to the things of daily experience, the things from which science sets out and to which it returns. The common-sense environment is constituted by the things and situations of ordinary

[1] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, Open Court, 1926, p. 7.

experience "in which human beings are directly involved."[2] It is these common-sense things which philosophy should render more significant and luminous.

That a philosophy should illuminate and give meaning to the things of our experience, I should whole-heartedly agree. We are confused by numberless clashing opinions, and what seems an unending particularity of situations. We look to philosophy for the standards by which to measure life and its ends, and for principles which apply to our daily happenings, making them significant. Perhaps the widespread response which Dewey's philosophy has awakened is partly due to his vigorous insistence that philosophy must enter into life-experiences.

There is another way of understanding common-sense things, that held by naïve realism or common-sense philosophy. According to this familiar view, the ordinary things of experience exist independently of, unaffected by, and prior to experience of them. They are directly experienced *just as they exist*. The marks of existence, or, what is the same thing, existence, is *given* with ordinary experience.

Dewey—the unwavering critic of antecedent reality, unaffected by knowing it—certainly rejects this common-sense view of the independent object. However, he retains an element of this view, including it in his conception of a common-sense object.

For Dewey insists that, if a philosophy is to throw light on the things of ordinary experience, they must not be deprived "of having in 'reality' even the significance they had previously seemed to have." This means, I believe, two things. It means (1) that the ordinary things of experience are to be regarded as having that same "existential" status which they were interpreted as having previous to any philosophic interpretation. They are to be regarded as somehow independent of knowledge of them. Dewey says that they must have their own "independent origin, history, and career."[3] Also this means (2) that these existential things must *exhibit their traits in direct experience*. The experienced traits of things must be regarded as traits of existence. That Dewey holds that things can not be prior to and unaffected by experience (of which knowing is a part) does not alter this latter belief.[4] The fact remains that the traits of existence—modified by knowing, if necessary—occur in experience—at least eventu-

[2] Dewey, *Logic*, New York, Henry Holt, 1938, p. 60.

[3] *Experience and Nature*, p. 17.

[4] However, it may be questioned whether the fact that things can not be antecedent to knowledge of them is consistent with the tenet that existing things must be regarded as somehow independent of knowledge of them.

ally—as they are. "The traits possessed by the subject-matters of experience are as genuine as the characteristics of sun and electron."[5] And these traits, both usual and scientific, significant and trivial, are directly experienced for what they are.

In other words, in so far as traits are directly experienced, existence is directly experienced for what it is. This is included in the common-sense belief that the things of ordinary experience are directly experienced just as they exist. To be sure, for Dewey, things are not completely given, nor given antecedent to inquiry. Yet it is this point which, along with the point that things are to be regarded as somehow independent of knowledge of them, he holds to be necessary to rendering common-sense things significant and not "depriving them of having in 'reality' even the significance they had previously seemed to have."

## II

It is the aim of this paper (1) to deny this second point, that traits of existence are directly experienced, and (2) to show that the things of familiar experience are given significance without being regarded as existing independently, as they are thought to exist by common sense, contrary to Dewey's first point.

The first point can be only briefly indicated here. As I have maintained in a previous article, the characteristics, or traits, of existence must be capable of being truly declared to hold and therefore can not be given in direct experience. The characteristics of existence are in no way directly given, whether partially, confusedly, implicitly, or problematically.[6] What existence is is not directly experienced, but must be worked out on the basis of direct experience and other knowledge, as an interpretation of experience which will best illuminate and explain it. That interpretation, determining the traits which existence is known to have, is not given, nor directly experienced. It is that which gives the things of ordinary experience their intelligibility, objectivity, and significance. Existence itself can not be given in experience. That assumption of common sense is here completely denied.

I may add, though there is not space for justification, that moral and esthetic traits are no more given in direct experience than other traits of existence. Though there must be the immediate experience susceptible of moral or esthetic interpretation, what is

[5] *Exprience and Nature*, p. 2.

[6] Cf. my "Experience as Given," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXIX (1942), pp. 385–389. This conception of experience and existence follows the philosophy of Karl Schmidt in his *The Creative I and the Divine*, N. Y., The Dial Press, 1937.

good in any situation or what lovely is not given. Those traits, too, are shaped by principles, must be capable of being declared truly good or lovely, and are not given in direct experience.

As for the second point, the things of experience are given significance by principles of interpretation which are themselves not given in experience. The physical occurrence of things may be made intelligible, and thus significant, by natural science. Or, things of familiar experience, as works of art, take on increasing splendor for the appreciator as his artistic "vision" grows. Or, again, familiar situations and objects are given a moral status; this act is to be done and this avoided. I believe that Dewey would agree that none of these principles by which the objects of familiar experience are given significance are themselves given in experience. None of them expresses traits of experience which are immediately had, even after investigation.

But the point I wish to make is that it is only such principles as may be justified which can give experience significance, in any meaningful use of the term. Customary interpretations of experience which are not capable of justification can not confer significance. *The common-sense interpretation of the traits of ordinarily experienced things as the traits of existence would confer no significance on those things.* For it does not add to their significance to give them the existential status assigned them in customary ways of regarding them. We may regard ourselves as objects moving among and reaching to other natural objects with their independent natural causes. In fact, that interpretation is in accord with the scientific explanation. But that does not mean that either what is directly experienced or what it may be customarily interpreted to be is a trait of existing natural objects. Ordinarily experienced traits are no more indicative of natural existence than the familiar experience of the sun setting is indicative of the relative motions of sun and earth. Nor would significance be added to experience of the sunset by regarding it as so indicative.

Take, for example, our common-sense notion of a bullet. In any one's customary use of it, its existence is not questioned. Its user learns how one kind of bullet differs from another and the technique of its use. He applies this knowledge, which is not given in experience. Also, there are other ways in which a bullet may be made significant. We may question the legitimate use of bullets. Bullets, when used in controlling the course of events, may be symbols of a good or bad method; and we look to morals and social studies for a solution of the question of "bullets or ballots." We may acclaim the "shot heard around the world," or exhibit a bullet

used in an historic battle. How we regard the significance of the bullet depends on the application to it of wider moral and social principles, which are not directly experienced. Its significance does not arise from regarding its ordinarily experienced traits—whatever those may be—as existential.

The nature of existence, such as the existence exemplified in the bullet, though not a question of ethics or history, is a central question of philosophy. Its definition is presupposed in a determination of those moral standards which are to render the things of daily conduct more significant. But to consider that the familiar things of experience exist as we commonly consider them to exist is not to render them more significant.

EDITH WATSON SCHIPPER

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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## BOOK NOTES

*The Discipline of Practical Judgment in a Democratic Society.* R. BRUCE RAUP (Chairman), KENNETH D. BENNE, GEORGE E. AXTELLE, B. OTHANEL SMITH. Yearbook Number XXVIII of the National Society of College Teachers of Education (Studies in Education). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1943. viii + 268 pp.

This book, the result of five years' coöperative study by its four authors, is an important contribution towards the reconstruction of democratic educational practice and theory. It is based on the conviction that the central difficulty of contemporary democracy results from the multiplicity of perspectives engendered by its highly specialized and mobile form of life, and that "the basic problem confronting our civilization is the development of methods of public deliberation and institutions that will create and clarify common perspectives and will promote decisions and policies in which all interested parties partcipate." The central task of the study is conceived as that of finding a way to meet this basic problem by developing "an adequate method of practical deliberation."

In its major task of uncovering such a method, the argument is developed against the background of Dewey's treatment of judgments of practice, and the activities or project methods which such educators as Kilpatrick have advanced. Yet sympathy is mixed with criticism. By calling to their aid certain recent work in the theory of signs (such as is found in Karl Britton's *Communication*) the authors have given a more detailed account of what is involved

in practical deliberation than has previously appeared, and by recognizing the inescapable appraisive and prescriptive factors in such deliberation, have seen clearly that an exclusive emphasis upon the content of science and scientific method is educationally insufficient, even though of basic importance. At the same time they believe that they have found a way of supplementing the major weakness of the activities program by providing an intellectual discipline which gives a tangible content to a normatively conceived education.

As opposed to an education which consists exclusively of factual survey courses or centers solely around the immediate interests of the student or seeks stability by invoking some past philosophical value structure, the authors envisage an education based on a technique of practical deliberation which finds its subject-matter in "the funded, normative, verbal heritage of the people" and its aim in "the continued and deliberate reconstruction of the human community": "Such a normative, intellectual discipline is obviously consonant with an education which centers in situations where policies are made—policies which guide decisions in the vital relations of the learner's life. This, we propose, is the proper completion of the normative education that has been struggling to be born in such efforts as that of the activities movement" (p. 249).

It is evident from this brief summary that the book intends both to describe the process of making decisions as to what ought to be done and to prescribe a direction for education which focuses upon the training of this process. The development of the position will require further study of the process itself. As it stands, the status of the proposed discipline of practical judgment is not very clear, and its relation to logic, to ethics, and to the theory of signs permits of and needs specification. In particular the problem of the adequacy of such judgments needs careful scrutiny; adequacy is relative to purposes and the advancement of the community of persuasion which the authors take as the criterion would seem to be only one of the purposes for which judgments of practice are made and not the sole or sufficient criterion. The authors themselves need to make clearer the designative, appraisive, and prescriptive factors in their own discourse. These issues will be clarified if the study is followed by an attempt to work out the details of an educational curriculum in which training in the making of policies is given a central place. The further development of the nature of the deliberate process and the making of concrete educational proposals to improve this process are tasks in which educators and philosophers alert to their contemporary responsibilities

can coöperate with profit. The present book has in a noteworthy way laid the foundations for significant educational advance.

CHARLES MORRIS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*L'engagement à l'Être: Essai sur la signification de la connaissance.* A. M. DE CRAENE. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer. 1941. 129 pp.

The aim of this book, modestly called an essay, is the ambitious one of bringing to light the metaphysical or "real" significance of the fact of knowledge. Its method is characterized by the author as "reflexive," which in this case seems to mean a method of reflective meditation on the notion of knowing, rather than an analysis of that which we know and its implications. Starting with a presentation of the *status quaestionis* based on the writings of Maréchal and Pierre Scheuer, the author progressively develops the following insights: (1) Thought is an active rather than a passive process—an affirmation of being; (2) Thought is an act of identification and determination of being; (3) The object-as-such of thought-as-such is being-as-such, and ultimately God; (4) Thought, or affirmation of being, has degrees of identity and activity corresponding to degrees in the hierarchy of participated being.

The essay belongs to that very numerous class of books in which the problem of knowledge is treated by a more or less dialectical method designed to produce insights and images in the reader's mind, such as may leave him with the conviction of having "seen" the ultimate truth about being and knowledge. One can almost hear the departing students say, as the vision fades, "I'm not sure what he meant, but I'm sure *he* knows."

E. A. M.

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## OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Bibliografia Argentina de Publicationes Filosoficas. Años 1937 a 1943. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Justicia e Instruccion Publica de la Nacion. 1943. 31 pp.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. LIII, 3. The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument: *Charles Hartshorne.* Definitions, Criteria, Standards, and Norms: *J. E. Reid.* On "Sensation": *A. L. Hammond.* Discussion—Robert Bridges and the Spiritual Animal: *A. J. Green.* Volkelt's Saving Humor: *Van Meter Ames.*

ETHICS. Volume LIV, Number 3. Compromise as a Political Ideal: *J. H. Hallowell.* The Limitations of Science and the Prob-

lem of Social Planning: *H. J. Morgenthau.* Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics: *A. C. Garnett.* How To Be: *E. H. Sloane.* Discussion—Facts and Reality in the Social Sciences: *A. G. Gruchy.* The Ethical Basis of Chinese Unity: *James Feibleman.*

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Volume II, Number 2. Logic in Our Common Knowledge or Logic in the Light of Common Sense, Common Knowledge, and Common Understanding: *W. E. Ritter.* The Pragmatist Theory of Truth: *V. G. Hinshaw, Jr.* Grading, A Study in Semantics: *Edward Sapir.* The Mythology of Science: *James Feibleman.*

PHILOSOPHIC ABSTRACTS. Number 13–14.

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM. Volume XVIII, Number 2. In Defense of St. Augustine: *A. C. Pegis.* Two Views on Immediate Inference: *John Wellmuth.* Bacon's Opinion of His Predecessors: *Edward Sutfin.* NOYΣ and Naturalism: *G. Kasten Tallmadge.* A Note on the Formal Object of Metaphysics: *G. B. Phelan.* A Bibliography of the Writings of John F. McCormick, S.J.

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## NOTES AND NEWS

The recently elected officers of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association are as follows: President, G. P. Conger; Vice-President, A. E. Murphy; Secretary-Treasurer, George R. Geiger; Members of the Executive Committee, George Gentry, Charner Perry, Howard D. Roelofs.

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### PHILOSOPHY FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

It is likely to be a matter of some interest to all who are concerned with the teaching and study of philosophy to learn that the Armed Forces Institute has authorized the preparation of a course on philosophy to be offered to members of the various branches of the service. The course will be the equivalent of a full year's college course. It involves a textbook to be entitled *Preface to Philosophy* (400 pages), a book of readings (450 pages), and a Workbook which is designed to enable those who are studying the course to instruct themselves and to see the relationship between the readings and the arguments of the textbook proper. The three books comprising this course have been newly prepared, written, and composed with a view to the specific purposes for which the courses of the Institute are designed.

The Armed Forces Institute under the direction of Colonel Francis Spaulding is charged with the duty of providing educational opportunities for members of the Armed Forces through

individual or group study whenever the circumstances will permit. As part of a large program which envisages the varied needs and interests of men at all stages of educational development there are many courses in subjects which belong to the college field. Men whose training would be at the stage of the third or fourth year high school and as far as the second year of college are the persons for whom such courses have been planned. The idea is that whenever there may be a cessation of hostilities in any area, and the thoughts of the men turn towards their future after demobilization, they shall have available to them facilities for study in subjects of their own choice, partly to orient themselves to the life of the citizen and partly to satisfy their individual curiosity, interest, or ambition. Sixteen such courses have been prepared in the field of general education, among them this particular course on philosophy.

The procedure has been for the Institute to obtain the advice and aid of the American Council of Education for this educational service to the Armed Forces. The American Council of Education entrusted its share in this work to a special committee under the chairmanship of Dean Thomas Russell McConnell of Minnesota, and this committee in turn designated certain of its members to convene panels of advisers who were called into consultation in regard to the course dealing with their respective subjects or fields of study. Dr. William Pearson Tolley, Chancellor of Syracuse University, has been Chairman of the panel called to deal with the course on philosophy. The following persons were called into consultation: Professors Brand Blanshard, Swarthmore College; T. M. Greene, Princeton University; Mary Shaw Kuypers, University of Minnesota; C. W. Hendel, Yale University; W. E. Hocking, Harvard University; J. H. Randall, Jr., Columbia University; and R. F. Piper, Syracuse University, Secretary. In June, 1943, this panel met and drew up a syllabus for a course which was scrutinized and discussed by the Committee of the American Council of Education, and, after modifications, approved and recommended to the Institute. The plan called for an entirely new text, a separate book of readings, and the Workbook which is a regular feature of these Institute courses. At the end of December, 1943, the following persons were requested by the Committe of the American Council and the Armed Forces Institute to prepare the respective sections of the text assigned to them:

I. *What is Man?* by Professor William Ernest Hocking.
II. *Social and Political Philosophy* by Professor Charles William Hendel.

III. *Personal Ethics* by Professor Brand Blanshard.
IV. *The Meaning of Religion* by Professor John Herman Randall, Jr.
V. *World Views* by Professor Hocking.

The book of readings is prepared by Dr. William Pearson Tolley, Chancellor, and Professors Raymond F. Piper and Ross E. Hoople, of Syracuse University.

The Workbook is in charge of Professor Robert F. Davidson, Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri.

The preparation of this course of philosophy has been accomplished under exacting and challenging conditions. Those participating in the enterprise were originally given only two months' time, from January first to March first, though this limit was extended eventually by a month. It was possible, even under this great restriction of time, for those who were composing their sections of the textbook and selecting material for the Reader and preparing the Workbook to come together and discuss their work. They thus managed to plan the integration of the several sections as they were being written, according to the approved syllabus, and even to criticize the drafts of their writing as well as the prepared selections for the Reader. The whole work has been one of genuine collaboration and done with signal unity of spirit and purpose, under the able direction and leadership of Dr. Tolley, the Chairman.

The textbook *Preface to Philosophy* and the book of readings are being separately published by the Macmillan Company. It is expected that the books may be of some value for general courses in philosophy offered in the first two years of the liberal arts colleges as well as in junior colleges. In any case they will be general trade publications.

Reported by CHARLES W. HENDEL

YALE UNIVERSITY
May 8, 1944

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For two summers Mount Holyoke College has been host to a large group of foreign and American scholars, writers, musicians, and artists, gathered for a four weeks' series of discussions on literature, art, science, philosophy, politics, and music. These meetings are the continuation in America of the *entretiens* held in France before the war at Paul Desjardin's Abbaye in Pontigny.

The third session of American *entretiens* will be held this year in South Hadley from July 23 to August 19 with the general subject *L'Idée de Crise et notre Crise.* The four weeks will be de-

voted respectively to philosophy, literature, plastic arts, and music under the direction of Jean Wahl, Marc Slonim, André Masson, and Marcelle de Manziarly. Each director will have four or more associates who will introduce the daily discussions. In general French is the language of the discussions and of social intercourse. Further information may be obtained from Mlle. Marie-Jeanne Bourgoin, Hooker House, South Hadley, Mass.